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During the Lebanese war of 1975 to 1990, 
the only public university of Lebanon 
branched out into more than 40 locations 
all over the country. While this deed 
reflects the inner division of Lebanon, it 
also moved the University nearer to the 
country’s geographical and social periph-
eries. Employing field research, newspa-
per articles, and grey literature this article 
gauges the effects of fragmentation in 
terms of the dynamics of social control 
that resulted from it. It shows that by the 
perspective of social control, sectarianism 
and clientelism can be observed as 
related with, but distinct from one 
another. 
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Introduction
Much has been written about sectarianism 
and sectarian clientelism in Lebanon from 
the viewpoint of political history (Sinno; 
Sharāra; Makdissi). Little has been pub-
lished about how it works on the micro-
sociological level, certainly when it comes 
to the country’s highly diverse education 
system (Nucho; Deeb and Harb).
In the context of political systems such as 
the Lebanese, sectarianism or communal-
ism (Arabic: madhhabiyya or ṭāʾifiyya) is a 
mode of distributing legal, political and 
administrative power among different reli-
gious groups. Beyond this meaning, sec-
tarianism is often used to mark a mentality, 
a pattern of loyalty which channels con-
tacts and forges relationships. This con-
cept of sectarianism widely overlaps with 
the one of clientelism. Both concepts, sec-
tarianism and clientelism by themselves 
have little explanatory or illustrative power 
in order to understand institutional rela-
tions. To look a bit deeper into the mecha-
nisms, by which they work, I was searching 
for a different perspective when studying 
the Lebanese higher education land-
scape.
Considering the academic benefits and 
costs of the Lebanese University’s (LU’s) 
institutional change, I got the impression 
that, besides the scattering of material and 
intellectual resources, the mode of social 
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control is an important standard by which 
the price for the apparent gain in access 
and social mobility can be illustrated. 
Browsing sociological theoreticians for 
the concept of social control, my attention 
was drawn to Horwitz (see table 1), who 
has shown that under conditions of indi-
viduation and anonymity, groups tend to 
rule by values, norms, and judiciary, 
whereas under conditions of proximity, 
group loyalty is prior to individual legal 
interest, and the mechanisms of rule are 
rather negotiation, settlement etc., in 
which personal social capital has more 
impact. Hence, with Horwitz, I theorize the 
modus of social control as a continuum 
between proximity and anonymity. 
In the context of higher education these 
concepts apply in that the separation of 
the individual university student from her/
his former social context of family, kinship, 
childhood and school time peers and 
neighborhood releases resources of time 
and energy to have contact with academic 
peers in an environment – usually an urban 
one – where her/his formerly earned repu-
tation is widely disregarded. Basically, 
such an anonymous setting levels the 
playing field for the students’ chances to 
build up an academic reputation through 
academic merit, independent of the social 
capital each of them had accumulated in 
their native environment before enrolling 
at university. In other words, a student liv-
ing in a dorm or shared flat in the capital 
is less likely to be asked e. g. to take care 
of her/his smaller siblings, sick relatives or 
of any communal issue; she or he will 
more likely spend her/his leisure time with 
classroom peers talking about issues con-
cerning their studies than a student living 
at her family’s home far from the capital, 
where only a small section of the university 
is situated.
Of course, the change in connectivity 
affects professors, too. A professor of LU’s 
Faculty of Law, Political and Administrative 
Science Branch 1 complained in an inter-
view with me that after the relocation of 
the faculty branch from central Beirut to 
the new built campus in Ḥadath (about ten 
kilometers to the South of Beirut) in 2007, 
their networking patterns changed con-
siderably. Whereas in the Hamra district in 
Beirut they had had contacts with col-
leagues from other universities and from 
many cultural backgrounds for lunch or 
after work, their daily encounters with col-
leagues in al-Ḥadath nowadays are usually 
restricted to colleagues from the same 
campus and from fewer socio-cultural 
backgrounds (LU Political Science 1 Senior; 
similar LU Political Science 2 Junior, who 
taught at three different campuses).
Most importantly, both a professor’s as 
well as a student’s academic performance 
and personality will less be looked at 
through the glasses of their general per-
sonality and their personal history when 
anonymity instead of proximity applies, 
and fewer people at university know them 
from their pre-academic and extra-aca-
demic contexts. 
This article is based on data from two 
research-projects: one being a collective 
project titled “Local, Regional and 
Conciliatory Compensatory Penal Therapeutic
Harm Relational Material Value Personality
Liability Shared Group Individual none
Goal Reconciliation Settlement Retribution Normality
Solution Negotiation Payment (“deal”) Penalty Treatment
Table 1: Major styles of social control according to Horwitz 
Source: Horwitz, Allan V. The Logic of Social Control. Plenum Press, 1990, p. 22.
Proximity/collective Anonymity/individual
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International Borrowing and Lending in 
Social Sciences at Egyptian and Lebanese 
Universities”, which I coordinated between 
2010 and 2015 as a research associate at 
the Orient-Institut Beirut, later at the 
Department of Oriental & Islamic Studies 
of the Ruhr-Universität Bochum.1  A group 
of four researchers and four student assis-
tants, we gathered data at four universities 
in Egypt and two in Lebanon, consisting of 
40 semi-structured interviews with faculty 
members and a standardized survey 
administered to several hundred students, 
plus the universities’ bylaws and annual 
reports. The second project, “History 
Writing at Lebanon’s Universities” I con-
ducted as a research associate of the 
Orient-Institut Beirut between 2015 and 
2018. For it, I cross-analyzed titles and con-
tent tables of doctoral theses in history 
from different branches of the Faculty of 
Arts and Humanities, and newspaper arti-
cles from leading daily newspapers of 
Lebanon. The data presented here, namely 
five faculty interviews and a number of 
newspaper articles and reports are but a 
small part of what we collected. 
Additionally, I analyzed three lectures and 
two scholarly articles by academics, who 
had studied LU as a subject of their own 
research while they belonged to its faculty 
or student cadre. 
From the sources, a picture of communal-
ism as both a legal and an informal mode 
of social control emerges by focusing LU 
as part of the administrative and service 
apparatus of the Lebanese Republic. The 
dialectic of communalism with either 
proximity or anonymity will be illustrated. 
To that end, socio-geographical and 
administrative changes implemented at 
LU since 1977 are highlighted in the next 
two sections. Section 4 shows a number of 
examples of how styles of social control 
impact on decision making at LU in mat-
ters of faculty appointment and the orga-
nization of student activities. Section 5 
gives an outlook on the public debate 
about the problems resulting from the 
situation of LU and possible policy conse-
quences in light of the existing patterns of 
social control. 
The Lebanese University Re-Structured 
Over Time
The Lebanese University (LU), which was 
founded in the course of the 1950s and 
1960s with the intention to merge and 
integrate the Lebanese communities on 
the level of intellectual and professional 
leadership, serves a highly illustrative 
example of how communalism dismem-
bered an institution, which was intended 
to counteract it and become an integrat-
ing force for the young nation.
The Lebanese war of 1975 to 1990 divided 
the country into different regions charac-
terized by different religious and ethnic 
communities through guarded and hard-
fought demarcation lines. As one of many 
calamities that sprang from this, large 
numbers of university students and staff 
across the country were not able to arrive 
at their institutions for work and study any-
more. Soon, some universities responded 
by opening branch campuses in regions 
or neighborhoods other than their main 
campuses. LU, the largest university of the 
country, and its only public one, branched 
out into more than 40 locations, from 
Tripoli in the north to Tyre in the south and 
the Bekaa valley in the east, based on a 
ministerial decree of 1976.2 As the earliest 
measure of this process, additional 
branches were created East of Beirut in 
predominantly Christian areas, whereas 
before the war, most of LU had been situ-
ated in West Beirut. This measure had 
been considered already before the war 
with the intention to de-centralize LU, but 
had been opposed by Muslim and leftist 
stakeholders (al-Amin, “Al-Jāmiʿa” 21). 
While it reflects the inner division of 
Lebanon, it also moved LU nearer to the 
country’s geographical and social periph-
eries and enabled a kind of socio-geo-
graphical inclusion different from the cul-
tural-confessional inclusion initially 
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intended: the fact that, nowadays, people 
living far from the capital can go to univer-
sity without leaving their families has 
made higher education accessible espe-
cially for unmarried women from tradi-
-
graphical periphery also facilitated 
studying at LU to many people who 
-
sions, are married and have founded fam-
-
mentation added an element of social 
mobility to Lebanon’s educational land-
Social equality, however, comes at a cer-
tain expense pertaining to the character of 
higher education: as one of the conse-
quences of LU’s fragmentation, its 
resources are stretched (Moussawi, 
-
ally by decision of Parliament, has to allo-
cate funding for several locations of the 
same faculty instead of just one, as was 
instead of one, along with a faculty secre-
Hence, libraries, for instance, are severely 
-
and of the Lebanese American University, 
-
umes each, and a far larger number of 
subscriptions and electronic publications 
Research is hence not very strong: LU pro-
duces only a third in number of the pub-
about ten times the number of students 
high percentage of LU’s dissertations 
deals with local topics detailed on hun-
Fig. 1: Cover sheets of doctoral theses from the Faculty of Arts/Lebanese University. 
Source: Courtesy of the author.
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #13–2019
FOCUS 68
The Development of School 
Education in the City of Tabnin 1982-2012 
Yamuna and the Role 
of its Municipality in its Development 1925 
to 2009 Bint Jbeil from indepen-
dence until 1970 The Economic, 
Social and Political History of Ainata, 1920 
to 1978 -
tion shelves that I searched in local librar-
ies of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities 
 
From Self-Administration to Political 
Administration
internationally common structure: a 
University Council, over which the 
University President presided, Faculty 
Councils over which the Deans presided, 
and Department Councils over which their 
4
branches to most of the faculties, the posi-
tion of a Director for each of these 
branches was created along with a branch 
council, hence a fourth level of administra-
locations, distant from the faculty 
become inactive for long periods of time, 
personalized around the person of the LU 
President, supervised by the government 
the appointment of full time faculty and 
higher administrative positions, as well as 
Minor decisions in the everyday manage-
ment of academic life are now mostly in 
the academic personnel in the depart-
ments have much less power over the 
course of the university’s activity than was 
initially intended by LU’s bylaws, because 
Fig. 2: Governance structure of the Lebanese University before 1977.
Source: Courtesy of the author.
Middle East – Topics & Arguments #13–2019
FOCUS 69
they are not represented in their faculty 
councils anymore, but in the branch coun-
-
During two long phases, institutions of 
-
Council was suspended and branch direc-
that professors be appointed by the gov-
-
administration has no say in the acquisi-
tion and little power over the allocation of 
Examples of Social Control at the 
Lebanese University
impact than the above described, how-
ever, and it can be associated with the 
forms of social control as outlined in 
above mentioned political science 
toward the entrance of the building, we 
passed a large window overseeing the 
movement in a row alternating with 
 holidays had 
-
prominence and constituency to the one 
calling itself Hizbollah (English translation: 
-
ing electoral lists and certain spaces of 
Lebanese 
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Fig. 3: Governance structure of LU as it emerged after 1977.
Source: Courtesy of the author.
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cially prohibited by LU’s administration the 
same year (Lebanese University). However, 
in Lebanon religious holidays and sym-
bols are often charged with political dis-
course. My interlocutor pointed to those 
flags remarking that under these influ-
ences, many students were ill at ease to 
come to campus and study. He pointed to 
the other side of the corridor, where 
another large window oversees the neigh-
borhoods of the southern, Shi’a domi-
nated suburbs of Beirut, the ḍāḥiyah, and 
added that “parties, tribes (qabāʾil) and 
clans (ʿashāʾir)” from there were exerting 
these influences (LU Political Science 1 
Senior).
The following sections show a few exam-
ples of the mechanisms of social control 
practiced in LU institutions. They concern 
the appointment of faculty and some cam-
pus activities organized by the student 
councils. 
1) Appointment of Faculty
As al-Amin (“Al-Jāmiʿa” 21-22) claims, after 
LU’s fragmentation 
“The selection of Branch Directors goes 
on in accordance with the geo-political 
particularities of the area in which the 
branch is situated. Hence, anyone of 
them enjoys political authority besto-
wed on him by the local forces.”
Similar procedures are applied to the 
selection of the LU President (al-Amin, 
“Al-Jāmiʿa” 31) and even the professors. 
Although the LU Council and the Faculty 
Councils were working again for a few 
years in the early 1990s, the government 
remained in charge for the appointment 
of the leading personnel and the profes-
sors of LU. The problems of clientelism, 
indiscriminate creation of positions and 
programs, and irregular demand of 
resources, however, which were intended 
to be addressed by this measure, were not 
mitigated. Instead, they were shifted into 
the political realm. The number of profes-
sors and administrative positions has 
grown considerably since then, because 
the politicians tend to just add to the nom-
inated candidates those they are in favor 
of (“Al-Jāmiʿa” 26 ; al-Amin et al., 59-60; 
al-Haj; Moussawi “al-Taʿlīm”; Haidar: 
al-Taʿlīm).
In 2010, the following occurred at the 
Faculty of Humanities, Branch 1 in West 
Beirut, according to one of its professors, 
whom I interviewed: the Dean split a fac-
ulty position into two, because they 
wanted a Shīʿite applicant to be appointed, 
although only Sunni and Christian appli-
cants had been shortlisted in light of the 
formal criteria in place. My interlocutor, 
who was a member of the commission 
processing the appointment, at first 
refused to sign the proposed arrange-
ment. However, after he saw the Dean, a 
friend of his, come under pressure from 
the Minister of Education, he finally gave 
in and signed, so that two Shi’a were 
appointed as professors, who were actu-
ally not qualified for that position (LU Arts 
1 Senior).
Later the same year, according to a news-
paper report (Khoder, “Menacée et agres-
sée”), the secretary of Branch 2 of the 
Faculty of Information, Laura Abi Tayyeh, 
quit her position after having been men-
aced at daylight on her way to work by two 
gunmen. She was known as being affili-
ated with the Forces Libanaises, a political 
party of the March 14 alliance favored by 
Christians. Soon, her position was filled by 
Antoine Khoury Harb, an adherent to the 
Christian dominated party in the opposite 
camp of the political spectrum, i.e. the 
Free Patriotic Movement. As stated in the 
report, the case was not examined any fur-
ther by LU’s administration, while a large 
group of students adherent to the same 
political camp as Abi Tayyeh staged a 
strike for several weeks. The same Antoine 
Khoury Harb seems to have been dis-
missed from his post as branch director 
three years later likewise in non-obser-
vance of the bylaws (al-Haj). 
In another example, a high ranking 
employee of the Ministry of Energy and 
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Water, Jean Aziz Boulos was appointed 
full time professor at LU in December 
2012, just a week before he reached his 
age of retirement. The case produced a 
scandal not least because, at the same 
time, files that had been submitted for the 
promotion of faculty from contracted to 
full time personnel at LU  were pending 
already for a long time: more than 600 
contracted faculty members fulfilling the 
criteria for full time appointment had 
already been waiting for their promotion 
for up to seven years (Haidar: Muwaẓẓaf; 
al-Hakam; “Deterrent Strike”; Touma) Non-
observance of bylaws in appointment pro-
cedures was a feature in many of my inter-
views and of the newspaper reports, 
regardless of the political allegiance of the 
authors.
2) Student Activities
Before the war, the Union of LU Students 
had been founded in 1971 (al-Amin, 
“Al-Jāmiʿa” 18). It organized elections of 
student representatives to the councils on 
all levels at LU: the University Council, 
Faculty Councils, and Department 
Councils (see fig. 2). In all these, their role 
was strictly advisory.
During the early war years, not only did 
these councils become inactive, but the 
Student Union also dissolved under the 
centrifugal forces of the ongoing political 
strife and LU’s fragmentation. What 
remained until present, are student coun-
cils on the branch level, whose function is 
to represent the students towards the pro-
fessors and the administration, and to 
organize students’ campus activities, such 
as holiday celebrations etc. (al-Amin, 
“Al-Jāmiʿa” 23). Student Council elections 
have not taken place since 2008 for fear of 
unrest. Hence, representatives have often 
bequeathed their office to younger stu-
dents of the same political party when 
they left university (LU Political Science 2 
Junior). They tend to be particularly active 
in branches, where one political party or 
electoral block is clearly predominant (see 
fig. 3). 
One such location is the large new univer-
sity campus in Ḥadath. In fact, the new 
Ḥadath campus did unite different parts of 
LU, namely several disciplines of Branches 
1 and a number of disciplines which had 
never been branched out. It did not unite 
Fig. 4: The flag of the AMAL movement next to the Lebanese flag in the entrance area of a faculty buil-
ding on the al-Ḥadath campus. 
Source: Al-Nahar Newspaper. 
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different branches of the same discipline, 
though. Thus, it created a sort of subsec-
tion of the university for the southern sub-
urbs. Here, the student councils exert an 
influence to a degree so great that at times 
they enforce the enrolment of students 
against official criteria, and even influence 
the appointment of professors against the 
will of the faculty leadership (Noor Addin, 
“Al-Anshiṭa al-Ṭullābiyya fī-l-Jāmiʿāt”; al-
Mosawi).
Campus life is culturally influenced by the 
dominant groups respectively (see fig. 4 
and  fig. 5). At the Western entrance of the 
Ḥadath campus, for instance, the one 
pointing to the predominantly Shi’i south-
ern suburbs, where HA and AMAL are the 
dominant political forces, I was greeted by 
huge portraits of leading clerics and oper-
atives of HA and AMAL on my field visits, 
although the display of any sort of political 
symbols or pictures on campus has been 
prohibited since 2012 (Lebanese 
University). On the eastern entrance, fac-
ing the Ḥadath neighborhood, which has 
a less clear-cut political allegiance, and in 
branches 2 of several faculties I visited 
east of Beirut I never saw portraits of poli-
ticians or other political symbols; whereas 
religious symbols are common there, too.5 
After Branch 1 of the Faculty of Fine Arts 
(Kulliyyat al-Funūn) was transferred from 
the center of Beirut to the campus in 
al-Ḥadath, its work has been disturbed by 
students from other faculty branches situ-
ated there, who consider it to contradict 
religious principles. Students of the Fine 
Arts were bullied for their participation in 
theater or film projects, and called gays 
and whores. Paintings and photographs to 
be exhibited at the end of semester were 
destroyed overnight. The student council 
of the campus, which is dominated by the 
two large Shi’i parties, put pressure on the 
campus administration to restrict or pro-
hibit theater, movie and music events. In 
reaction to the pressure, the newly built 
assembly hall is not used for the exhibition 
of semester works anymore, but these are 
exhibited in classrooms instead. Also 
rehearsals and other preparatory meet-
ings were interrupted and sabotaged by 
religious political activists. Remarkably, 
these cases were reported in an extensive 
report in the pro-HA daily Al-Akhbār 
(Hayek, “Ṭullāb al-Funūn taḥt al-Ḥiṣār”).
Fig. 5: Statue of the virgin Mary at the entrance to the campus of the Faculty of Arts (Kulliyyat al-Ādāb) 
in al-Fanār.
Source: Courtesy of the author.
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In another example, a group of 30 student 
adherents of HA interfered in a commem-
oration ceremony for a student who had 
died in an accident, because music by two 
famous Lebanese singers was planned for 
the event. The students organizing the 
event claimed to have taken permission 
for that from the director of the faculty 
branch, Khaled Tawil. The HA students, 
however, argued that their interference 
was in accordance with an agreement 
reached three years before between the 
Student Council, the campus administra-
tion, and the Office of the Student 
Movements active on the campus (i. e. HA 
and AMAL), which rules that any such 
event could only be permitted by agree-
ment between all three sides (“Interdiction 
de chansons”; “Vague d’indignation”). 
While the students suggested this as a jus-
tification of their conduct, the incident 
shows, in fact, how a settlement practice 
has actually reached the status of implicit 
rule and replaced official regulation, thus 
granting the Student Council compe-
tences clearly beyond those intended in 
the bylaws.
Notwithstanding the attitude taken against 
the songs by Fairuz and Julia Boutros in 
the mentioned incident, HA student activ-
ists do play music on the Ḥadath campus 
in the form of Political and religious songs, 
e.g. during celebrations of ʿ Ashūra, and on 
25 May, the commemoration day for the 
withdrawal of the Israeli Army from South 
Lebanon in 2000, as a doctoral student 
from a Faculty in al-Ḥadath reported in a 
lecture at an AUB conference. Moreover, 
high ranking political and religious offi-
cials are often invited to give lectures or 
hold speeches at graduation ceremonies, 
and at events of religious mobilization, 
such as the delivery of prizes for the best 
veiled female students (akhawāt) or the 
Day Against Offending the Prophet 
(dhudh Isāʾat al-Rasūl), despite the gen-
eral prohibition to do so by the university 
administration (Noor Addin, “Al-Anshiṭa 
al-Ṭullābiyya fī-l-Jāmiʿāt”). Professors in 
Branch 2 of the Faculty of Law and Political 
Science, conversely, strictly abstained 
from inviting politicians as speakers in line 
with the new ruling. They were even 
instructed by their branch administration 
to abstain entirely from discussing current 
national politics in classrooms, as a politi-
cal science professor asserted to me, 
which he found hard to apply in light of 
the subject matters of the discipline (LU 
political science 2 senior).
When negotiation does not bring the 
intended results, violence is sometimes 
employed in conflicts among students, 
some of which are not political in cause, 
but are quickly charged with ideological 
meaning (Moussawi, “Tajaddud 
Ishtibākāt”; Mushallab, “Ishtibāk”, 
“Tajaddud”).
Outlook
The examples in this article hint that a 
great many decisions at LU are made by 
way of negotiation and settlement, some-
times with the help or under threat of vio-
lence, while unlawful acts are committed 
without penalty. With LUʿs departments 
nearer to the places of origin of their con-
stituencies, contacts between different 
players now follow a logic of proximity 
rather than of anonymity, thereby tighten-
ing the politico-religious ties often labeled 
as sectarianism. The decrease in power of 
the councils opened the doors for interfer-
ence on different levels of loyalty rather 
than explicit regulation. LU’s proximity to 
its students’ and professors’ native polit-
ico-religious environment seems systemic. 
Some observers even report that the char-
acter of teaching, too, and the character of 
nominally the same university degree vary 
from branch to branch, depending on the 
given communal influences (al-Amin, 
“Al-Jāmiʿa” 22; “Al-Baḥth” 8). However, to 
explore the effects of LU’s fragmentation 
on its teaching contents and practices is 
beyond the scope of this paper, and can 
probably only be done by insiders.
In the public and academic discourse LU’s 
fragmentation (tafrīʿ) is often associated 
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with a decline in quality and indepen-
dence (al-Amin et al.; Moussawi, “al-Taʿlīm”; 
Khalifeh; and many of our interlocutors). 
However, this move seems irreversible. 
The creation of the new Ḥadath campus in 
2007 with its relative pluralism of cultural 
backgrounds in faculty and student body 
is what comes nearest to a step in the 
direction of unification, which was not fol-
lowed through. So, maybe al-Ḥadath 
shows a kind of vision of LU’s future if re-
unification were implemented. Complete 
re-unification, however, would mean a 
reduction of positions and resources, on 
which a large number of individuals and 
networks operate. Many groups and stake-
holders would certainly resist it, openly or 
silently, especially in light of the asymme-
tries in populace, mobilizational and para-
military capacity between the different 
politico-religious teams.
Much of the debate around LU has a nos-
talgic air and presents somewhat tauto-
logical arguments: there is no account-
ability and no transparency, because the 
LU cadres play a stitch-off or are to „weak“ 
to create transparency or accountability 
(Moussawi, “Al-Jāmiʿa al-Lubnānīya” 298–
299). The examples in this article show that 
under conditions of proximity with their 
socio-cultural background, contacts 
among interest groups have an almost 
compelling dynamic that can hardly be 
resisted, except perhaps in rare cases of 
outstanding personal strength. Under 
such circumstances, it is hard for the cad-
res to play according to rules and norms 
of a national, i.e. super-communal charac-
ter. Further we read that LU is corrupt 
because of its communal structure, or it 
remains confessional, because of its clien-
telism (Khalifeh 20-21). Clientelism is cer-
tainly a problem also at other universities 
around the world, though, where posi-
tions do not have to be distributed among 
a variety of confessional groups. 
Some participants in the debate about a 
reform brought up the idea that LU might 
fare better if its parts established them-
selves as widely independent institutions. 
If the different parts became independent 
concerning their academic emphases and 
the acquisition and allocation of their 
resources, that could make them more 
flexible and set free the creative forces of 
competition among them (e. g. “Al-Baḥth”). 
It seems reasonable that, when services 
are de-centralized, also policy-making 
should be. Independent in their policies, 
the different parts of LU could set up regu-
lations that take local values and needs 
better into account. Rule by negotiation 
could perhaps then decrease in favor of 
more locally designed explicit regulations; 
decision making could become less per-
sonalized and more accountable, in what 
is now a national symbol widely devoid of 
the integrating force hoped for by its 
founders. Applying Horwitz’ perspective 
of social control it seems that, this way, cli-
entelism could be contained even in a 
sectarian environment that will most prob-
ably remain in place for the foreseeable 
future.
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4 The organizational charts in 
Figures 2 and 3 depict only 
four out of 19 units of LU: The 
Faculties of Law, Political and 
Administrative Sciences, of 
Literature and Humanities, 
of Pedagogy, and the 
Institute of Social Science. 
Blue: faculty, red: students, 
green: Government/public 
administration. Green arrows 
symbolize discretionary 
power, orange arrows 
symbolize advisory function. 
I left out most arrows in 
Figure 2, not necessarily 
because competences 
aren’t delimited, but 
because, from my level of 
insight, I couldn’t tell. The 
party symbols in Figure 
3 are randomly situated 
near certain institutions. 
They do not depict the 
factual composition of their 
presence in a given branch, 
but only symbolize the fact 
that particular compositions 
of their presence prevail in 
different branches.
5 Portraits of the President of 
State can be found in halls 
and offices all over LU. 
Notes
1 We thank the Volkswagen 
Foundation for funding two 
years of this work in the frame 
of its program Civil Societies 
in the Middle East. Evaluation 
of part of the gathered data 
and authoring of an article 
was made possible through 
a funded fellowship in the 
Re-Configurations network 
at the Center for Near and 
Middle East Studies of 
Marburg University. For some 
of the results see Kriener, 
“Different Planets”, “Al-ʿUlūm”, 
Mougheeth.
2 The causes and impact 
of this decision have been 
elaborated as early as 1999, 
see Amin et al.: Qadhāyā, 
particularly chapters 2 and 3. 
Since then, the fragmentation 
has made considerable 
progress, see Moussawi, “Al-
Jāmiʿa”, “Al-Taʿlīm”; Amin,“Al-
Jāmiʿa”.
3 This section, including 
the organizational charts 
in it, is based on Lebanese 
Republic, “Law 75/67” and 
“Law66/2009”; Amin,“Al-
Jāmiʿa”; Moussawi,“Al-Taʿlīm”, 
“Al-Jāmiʿa”; and Amin, 
Personal interview.
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